Introduction
Much of the recent literature on the indispensability argument for mathematical realism discusses the 'indispensable explanatory role' of mathematics. It is commonplace to articulate the Quine-Putnam defence of mathematical realism in explicitly explanatory terms, and for many the prospects of platonism hang on the indispensability or otherwise of mathematics to empirical explanations. This paper identifies and addresses a clear lacuna in this prominent line of research: examining explanatory indispensability from the point of view of specific conceptions of scientific explanation. I will incentivize the task of filling out this critical lacuna and also take some initial steps towards it by introducing a pertinent distinction regarding the way in which mathematics contributes to explanation. Drawing this distinction is critical especially for the ontological conclusion of the indispensability argument.
To set the context I will review the significance of the notion of 'explanatory role' for the mathematical indispensability argument, first in general terms (Sect. 2), and then with reference to a particular mathematical explanation (Sect. 3).
After drawing a distinction between ontologically committing 'thick' and ontologically peripheral 'thin' explanatory roles in general terms (Sect. 4), I will further examine this distinction in relation to three notable 'ontic' accounts of explanation:
Jackson and Pettit's program explanation (Sect. 5); Woodward's counterfactual account (Sect. 6); and Strevens's kairetic account (Sect. 7). The connection between explanation and ontology is prima facie most plausible in the context of such ontic accounts of explanation, as opposed to epistemic or modal accounts, as I will explain (Sect. 4). In each case we will find ample room for regarding mathematics as playing only a thin, ontologically peripheral role in mathematical explanations of empirical phenomena. In conclusion I will discuss the take-home message in the broader context of other explanationist realist arguments (Sect. 8).
Realism and Explanatory Indispensability
Many realist arguments support ontological commitment to X by pointing to X's explanatory indispensability. This is exemplified by Baker's 'Enhanced Indispensability Argument' for mathematical realism:
(1) We ought rationally to believe in the existence of any entity that plays an indispensable explanatory role in our best scientific theories.
(2) Mathematical objects play an indispensable explanatory role in science.
(3) Hence, we ought rationally to believe in the existence of mathematical objects. (Baker 2009, p. 613) This is, of course, just the familiar Quine-Putnam defence of platonism cast explicitly in terms of the 'indispensable explanatory role' of mathematics. 1 The key idea is that the indispensability argument should really turn on the specific kind of indispensability that commits a scientific realist to paradigmatic (nonmathematical) theoretical posits, such as electrons, quarks, and black holes; arguably the scientific realist is committed to such unobservables precisely because these 'theoretical posits' play an indispensable explanatory role in our best science.
This focus on mathematics' indispensable explanatory role is widespread in the current debates on the indispensability argument. The connection between a posit's explanatory role and ontological commitment to it is endorsed by some leading mathematical fictionalists alike. Field (1989) , for example, states that:
If a belief plays an ineliminable role in explanations of our observations, then other things being equal we should believe it, regardless of whether that belief is itself observational, and regardless of whether the entities it is about are observable. (Field 1989, p. 15) 2 Both sides of the debate largely agree that one cannot respond to the explanationfocused indispensability argument by insisting that there cannot be mathematical 1 The indispensability argument in the Quine-Putnam tradition turns on a broader notion of indispensability, typically associated more closely with predictions and confirmation. In the more recent literature there has been a distinct shift towards the explanationist construal of indispensability.
2 It is clear from the quote's context that 'unobservable entities' for Field can include mathematical abstracta, and an important part of Field's (1989) defence of fictionalism is his denial that mathematics ever plays such an 'ineliminable' explanatory role. explanations of empirical phenomena since all scientific explanation is causal. 3 The disagreement is rather about whether or not it is the case that 'mathematics can play non-causal explanatory roles in science and that this is a real role' (Colyvan 2012, p. 1033). Colyvan aptly sums up the gist of the debate:
[A] great deal hangs on the role of mathematics in scientific explanations. If mathematical entities do not play the right sort of role in scientific explanations, then this needs to be spelled out in a way that distinguishes mathematical entities from other entities quantified over in our best scientific theories. (Colyvan 2012 (Colyvan , p. 1043 Given the state of debate, the key notion of 'explanatory role' is in dire need of clear analysis. But while there have been some efforts to spell out contrasting intuitions about whether or not mathematics is genuinely explanatory of empirical phenomena, remarkably the literature has made almost no contact with philosophical accounts of explanation. 4 In the current state of debate it is very much unclear exactly what 'mathematics' explanatory role' amounts to, and it is difficult to say who in the debate gets the upper hand regarding the contested claim that mathematics really does play such a role in science. What we have on the table goes little beyond largely unregimented interpretations of a heterogeneous assortment 3 This both begs the question and is in tension with the actual science which is seemingly teeming with non-causal explanations. 4 Baker 2005 contains a brief discussion of three broad accounts of explanation. Lyon 2012 is a much more notable exception, which I will presently examine (Sect. 5). See also Batterman 2010 and Pincock 2011 for a useful analysis of the explanatory role of mathematics in the context of the so-called mapping account of applied mathematics. Apart from these few exceptions the growing literature on the indispensability argument just floats freely of theories of explanation. For example, while Baker 2009 ably analyses (and defends) the notion that mathematics is indispensable for some of our best scientific explanations, he says little in general about what it is to play an explanatory role, and none of his analysis relates to a considered theory of scientific explanation. Similarly-on the other side of the debate-Yablo 2012 has recently argued that mathematics' indispensability in scientific explanations can be interpreted in ways that do not support the indispensability arguments, since the explanatory role need not be played by mathematical objects. Yablo's point is in my view well-taken, but again it is worth pointing out that his analysis of mathematics' explanatory roleis given in general terms and not in relation to any specific account of scientific explanation.
of examples of scientific explanations that somehow involve mathematics in an important way.
How do we best push the debate forward? Common sense suggests that we should aim to bring our best understanding of scientific explanation to bear on the debate and examine the notion of '(mathematics') explanatory role' in relation to different analyses and conceptions of explanation. In this way we can hope to gain a much closer grip on 'explanatory role' so as to be better placed to judge whether mathematics plays the kind of explanatory role that actually matters for the ontological debate in question.
In the rest of this paper I will take some initial steps in this direction, by first looking into the notion of 'explanatory role' in general terms, before examining it in more detail in relation to three specific accounts of explanation. The premise (1) of the Enhanced Indispensability Argument above is undermined as a result.
Dissecting 'explanatory role'
Let us briefly recall a central example of allegedly explanatory mathematics to begin with. (The rest of our discussion will benefit from having this staple example clearly in mind. Although I regard the example as problematic on multiple counts (see e.g. Saatsi 2011), for all its shortcomings and simplicity it functions well to illustrate the points I wish to make, and it will also conveniently allow us to relate the present point of view to earlier literature.) 5 Explanandum: why is the life-cycle of the North-American cicada 13 or 17 years (depending on sub-species)?
Stylized explanation of the 17-year pediod: 6 5 Lange 2013 refines the conception of the cicada explanation as a mathematical explanation. I will stick to Baker's original presentation to better reflect the evolving dialectic around it. 6 Quoted from Baker 2009 (p. 614).
(4) Having a life-cycle period which minimizes intersection with other (nearby / lower) periods is evolutionarily advantageous.
[ (5) and (6) really contributing to the explanatoriness of the explanation of (8) If we follow these authors to accept the lead from scientific practice and admit that mathematics can indeed be indispensable to some of our best scientific explanations, is there any room left for me manoeuvre? Is it not simply incoherent to now deny that mathematics plays an indispensable explanatory role?
Well, answer to this question turns out on closer reflection to depend on what we mean by 'explanatory role'. It now becomes critical for us to clarify this notion in order to zero in on the key point of contention. For while there undeniably is a sense in which we can construe mathematics in the cicada and other examples as 'explanatory', or as 'playing an explanatory role', what really matters for the indispensability argument-all that matters!-is whether or not mathematics plays the kind of explanatory role that we should take as ontologically committing. A properly informed analysis of scientific explanation is required in order to see whether a face value reading of scientific practice (and the admission that mathematics is indispensable for explanations) implies that mathematics plays an explanatory role that is ontologically committing.
Instead of bluntly denying that mathematics is in no sense explanatory at all (or plays no explanatory role whatsoever), a critic of the explanatory indispensability argument is much better off insisting that mathematics does not play the right kind of explanatory role. This strategy, of course, requires that we can somehow distinguish between different types of explanatory roles, some 'thick' and ontologically committing, others 'thin' and ontologically peripheral. The next section will discuss this distinction in the abstract, along with some other useful distinctions. After that I will show how this kind of distinction can be drawn in the context of some specific ontic accounts of explanation. Salmon (1985) introduced the notion of ontic account of explanation, distinguishing it from epistemic accounts, on the one hand, and modal accounts, on the other. This tripartite classification is well known in the philosophy of scientific explanation. It is worth recalling it here as its relevance has never been noted in the present context. For our discussion a useful way of characterising the classification is as follows.
Useful distinctions
The basic idea behind an ontic conception of explanation is that explanation is a matter of situating the explanandum within a broader ontic structure of the world.
The explanatory power derives from stating some relevant worldly facts: objective causal or mechanistic facts, or nomological facts, or statistical relevance relations, or symmetries, or whatever ontic structures can bear an objective relationship of explanatory relevance to the explanandum. (Causal and causal-mechanical accounts of explanation are paradigmatic examples of the ontic conception, and also what Salmon primarily had in mind in characterising this conception, but we should construe 'ontic structure of the world' in broader terms to make room for mathematical and non-causal explanations.) Typically explanatory relevance is a matter of exhibiting some kind of dependence of the explanandum on the explanans, in the way 'difference-making' relations do in the paradigmatic case of causal explanation, for instance. But not all explanatory dependence is causal. A law can depend on other laws in an explanatory way, but laws do not cause other laws. An explanandum can depend on structural constitution in an explanatory way that is not causal, as in the case of glass's fragility being explained by its molecular structure. An explanandum can depend on more abstract (yet still real) structural features of the world, as in the case of a Lorentz-contraction being explained in relativity in terms of the fundamental kinematic structure of reality. We can also envisage the possibility of some kind of sui generis dependence of certain physical facts on some mathematical facts so as to make conceptual room within the ontic conception for ontologically committing mathematical explanations.
The basic idea behind an epistemic conception of explanation, by contrast, is that an explanation is whatever we give in order to explain, where explaining is an epistemic activity of providing understanding. Following Hempel and many others, providing understanding can be viewed as a matter of showing that the explanandum was to be expected (given the explanans), but different conceptions of understanding are possible. According to an epistemic conception the explanat-ory power of an explanation derives from the fact that the explanatory information suitably entails the explanandum so as to provide understanding. It does not derive from the explanation pointing to features of reality that stand in a worldly relationship of explanatory relevance to the explanandum.
Finally, according to Salmon the modal conception a scientific explanations does its job by 'showing that what did happen had to happen' (Salmon 1985, p. 293) . This is quite ambiguous by itself, and it is difficult to see any clear difference to the ontic conception: after all, situating the explanandum within a broader ontic structure of the world (as per the ontic conception) can show why the explanandum had to happen given that structure. Salmon thought the distinction between ontic and modal conceptions is a substantial one, but only in the context of indeterministic physics. Since this isn't our present context, Salmon's (somewhat inchoate) remarks on modal conception (mostly made in the context of probabilistic and statistical explanations) are of little interest to us here.
What is of interest, however, is a recent characterisation of the modal conception by Lange, according to whom 'the modal conception, properly understood, applies at least to distinctively mathematical explanation in science, whereas the ontic conception does not' (Lange 2013, p. 510) . The modal conception, as Lange understands it, takes explanation to be a matter of showing that the explanandum is inevitable in the sense that it holds independently of any contingent ontic structure at stake.
To illustrate: Mother failed to distribute twenty-three whole strawberries evenly among her three children. Why? Because twenty-three cannot be evenly divided by three. According to Lange the explanatory power here stems from modal information provided by the mathematics, transcending the modal information provided by any (actual or possible) causal or nomic structures involved in the process.
[T]hat twenty-three cannot be divided evenly by three supplies inform-ation about the world's network of causal relations: it entails [as a matter of mathematical necessity] that there are no [counterlegally possible] causal processes by which twenty-three things are distributed evenly (without being cut) into three groups. (Lange 2013, p. 496) That is, according to the modal conception (thus understood) we can explain by showing, by reference to mathematical facts, that the explanandum had to take place, or be the way it is, regardless of what the ontic structure of the world is like (as long as the world satisfies the description of the system at stake, involving a mother, and so on). 10 Let us now consider the issue of ontological commitment in relation to this rough-and-ready distinction between ontic, epistemic, and modal conceptions. Prima facie, the connection between explanatory mathematics and ontological commitment to mathematics is plausible in the context of an ontic account of explanation, since according to the ontic conception explanatory power is derivative only from stating explanatorily relevant worldly facts. Given the characterisation of ontic explanation it is natural to think, prima facie, that if (purported) reference to X is indispensable for explaining, then X is real, as dispensing with X results in a loss of explanatory power, which is (purportedly) due to leaving out information about an ontic relationship of explanatory relevance between X and the explanandum.
If mathematical explanations are instead best construed in the fashion of either the epistemic or the modal conception, it is much less clear what the connection between explanation and ontological commitment is meant to be, and as a result explanatory indispensability arguments become immediately more contentious.
Consider the modal conception first. Here mathematics can play an explan-10 Note that an explanation conforms to the modal conception only if it provides such explanatory modal information without simultaneously providing ontic information about some kind of dependence relation connecting the explanandum to the relevant mathematical facts or properties. If an explanation provides such modal information by virtue of showing, for example, how the explanandum only depends on the system instantiating certain abstract mathematical properties, then it should be viewed as ontic. atory role by virtue of being part of a derivation or deduction that shows that the explanandum was inevitable to a stronger degree than results from any assumptions regarding the ontic structure in place. Lange (2013) and ontological commitment. The platonist may been feel that an anti-realist will not be able to account for the indispensability of mathematics for obtaining such modal information. But it is not like the platonist has at this point an explanatory upper hand by being able to say something informative about the connection between mathematical facts and modal facts. And I do not see any reason to think that mathematics as construed by a fictionalist, for example, would be unable to provide the kind of modal knowledge that matters according to Lange. 11 Now, let us move on to briefly consider the epistemic conception. Here an element of an explanation can be a source of explanatory power by virtue of its function in providing understanding. For example, if understanding is equated with nomic expectability, an advocate of the epistemic conception can take mathematics as explanatory if it is employed in an explanatory argument to show that (nonmathematical) laws and initial conditions entail the explanandum so as to demonstrate that it was to be expected. Playing an indispensable explanatory role of this sort could be a matter of calculational support, say; perhaps nomic expectability of the explanandum would otherwise be only apparent to a Laplacean demon, for instance. It is immediately far from clear why this conception of understanding-or other conceptions, for that matter-would give us grounds to construe mathematics realistically. 12 So, to sum up, the ontic conception of explanation affords the most plausible connection between explanatory indispensability and ontological commitment, prima facie. In the rest of the paper I will focus on some of the best developed and most influential contemporary accounts of explanation, all of which are ontic ac-11 Note also that mathematics can also be used to obtain explanatory modal information even when it is not indispensable. The strawberry example is a case in point, since it can be paraphrased into an argument in first-order logic entailing the explanatory modal fact without referring to numbers.
12 There is an interesting connection here to issues concerning the question whether understanding is factive: several philosophers have argued that falsehoods (such as idealized models) can function to provide understanding and even be indispensable for it. See e.g. Elgin 2004. counts, to show that even in the context of the ontic conception the connection between explanation and ontology is much less direct than has been appreciated in the indispensability debate. 13 The crux of the matter is to recognise that within the ontic conception there is scope for critical, more fine-grained distinctions between different types of explanatory roles. We can start by conceiving the following dichotomy in the abstract:
'Thick explanatory role' is played by a fact that bears an ontic relation of explanatory relevance to the explanandum in question.
'Thin explanatory role' is played by something that allows us to grasp, or (re)present, whatever plays a 'thick' explanatory role.
In the following sections I will affirm the prospects of drawing this broad dichotomy in the context of some specific accounts of explanation. Recognising the possibility of this kind of dichotomy is significant because it points to the fact that even within the ontic conception of explanation not every explanatory role is necessarily ontologically committing (or at least is not obviously so). Only a thick explanatory role can be related to ontological commitment in a fairly straightforward way, and the critical question regarding the indispensability argument is, of course: Does mathematics ever play a thick explanatory role, or does it only play a thin one?
This question, I submit, can be properly answered only in the context of specific accounts of explanation, which also allow us to make clearer and more precise the distinction between thick and thin explanatory roles. I will now turn to these accounts. 13 I do not pretend to have shown that the debate is a nonstarter in the context of modal or epistemic conceptions. But while further work remains to be done in this context, we can appreciate the corresponding lacuna in the indispensability debate just on the basis of our broad characterisation of these two conceptions.
Lyon (2012) To see this problem clearly, let us briefly recall Lyon's argument. Jackson and Pettit (1990) introduce the notion of program explanation by contrasting it with a process explanation, which is a fine-grained, straightforwardly causal explanation.
A program explanation is more abstract, and is causal only in a derivative sense: it cites a property which guarantees the instantiation of some causally efficacious property involved in a process explanation of the same explanandum. According to Jackson and Pettit, a liquid's temperature T , for example, can (program-)explain the cracking of a glass receptacle by virtue of playing a programming role with respect to a lower-level property also instantiated by the liquid: some particular molecules hitting the receptacle wall with a high-enough collective momentum to cause the cracking. 14 Jackson and Pettit use examples like this to depict a sense 14 See Jackson and Pettit 1990 for details. in which a higher-level property (such as T ), which is not causally efficacious itself, can nevertheless be explanatorily (and causally) relevant by virtue of standing in a suitable 'programming' relationship to some causally efficacious lower-level property.
The program explanation account is an ontic one: a successful explanation of an event E requires that we point to a feature of the world that is explanatorily relevant by virtue of there being a sense in which E depends on that feature of the world. The properties that are explanatorily relevant in this sense, by virtue of 'programming', play a thick explanatory role characterised by an intimate modal relation between the higher-level programming facts and the lower-level causal facts. (Basically, it is not possible to have an explanatory higher-level fact without also having one or another causally efficacious lower-level fact. In many examples this relation between the properties is some kind of 'realization' relation.) Jackson and Pettit capitalise on this modal relation to argue that a higher-level property provides information about what the explanandum depends on, going beyond the information provided by the corresponding lower-level process explanation. 15 Lyon argues that mathematical explanations can also be viewed as program explanations.
They cite properties and/or entities which are not causally efficacious but nevertheless program the instantiation of causally efficacious properties and/or entities that causally produce the explanandum. And importantly, they cite mathematical properties and/or entities that are doing (at least part of) this programming work. (Lyon 2012, p. 567) The thought is that mathematical explanations can be similarly understood as pointing to mathematical facts on which the empirical explanandum in question de-pends. Lyon argues, in reference to the cicada case, for example, a detailed (historicoecological) process explanation fails to exhaustively explain the cicada phenomenon, because it 'misses the fact that the final evolutionary outcome, the convergence on 13 and 17, is robust with respect to the historico-ecological details' (Lyon 2012, p. 567) . Arguably a program explanation is needed in order to explain this robustness-the fact that the convergence to these specific periods only depends on them being co-primes to every alternative period in the relevant range of possibilities-and here mathematics becomes indispensable:
[I]f we take away any mention of primeness from the cicada explanation, the explanation falls apart, and there doesn't seem to be anything that would put it back together. (Lyon 2012, p. 568) In this way mathematics arguably plays a thick explanatory role of programming.
There are various difficulties in construing mathematics as playing a programming role (cf. Saatsi 2012) . A key problem is the following. For Jackson and Pettit 'programming' is a matter of a modal relation holding between higher-level ('programming') and lower-level (causally efficacious 'process') properties. 16 It is critical to have a grip on this modal relation in order to grasp the sui generis explanatory dependence at stake: program explanations are explanatory by virtue of providing information about a higher-level dependence rooted in the modal relation between higher-and lower-level properties. But we have no such grip at all for the alleged modal relation that is meant to hold between a mathematical fact and the lower-level causal facts.
An alternative and perhaps better way to express the problem is this. An advocate of the enhanced indispensability argument needs to establish that mathematics is playing a thick, ontologically committing explanatory role; establishing indispensability simpliciter is not enough. In the context of the program explanation idea, this can only be done by providing a substantial account of the modal relationship between the mathematical features that allegedly 'program', on the one hand, and the properties that feature in the corresponding process explanations.
Lyon does not provide anything to this effect, however; rather, he just stresses mathematics' explanatory indispensability in explanations that he construes as program explanations (see, for example, the quote above). But this is not enough, as indispensable mathematics here could instead be interpreted as playing a thin, ontologically peripheral role. cases where such causal interpretation is not available, however. Cf. references above. 20 )
For Woodward a DN-type deduction is only explanatory to the extent it provides such modal information. The explanatoriness (or 'explanatory power') of an argument or derivation springs from correctly representing the relevant objective dependency relations in the world, grounded in the world's actual (causal-)nomological structure. 21 The account thus accords with the ontic conception of explanation.
The explanatory dependency relations can furthermore be found at different 'levels'.
For example, there is a dependency relation that connects the cracking of the glass receptacle (in the section above) to the liquid's temperature, allowing Woodward to conceive the temperature as a cause of the cracking (in Woodward's precise sense of causation).
Woodward's account has the following feature that is of great interest to us here. While it is explicitly an ontic account, it allows at the same time for a kind of instrumentalism about genuinely explanatory theories: there is no need to accept the 'widely shared idea' that 'successful explanation is at bottom a matter of getting fundamental ontology right' (Woodward 2003b, p. 232 ). This instrumentalism is furthermore directly motivated by the scientific practice.
[My account] is less demanding about the need for explanatory theories to have a defensible 'realistic' interpretation (in the sense of postulating only 'real' entities) and assigns a more prominent role to 'instrumental' success than many competing theories of explanation.
. . . [S]uch an account fits explanatory practice in many areas of science 20 Woodward (2003b, Sect. 5.9) gives the example of explaining the stability of planetary orbits in terms of its counterfactual dependence on the dimensionality of space.
21 As Woodward puts it: 'It is physical dependency relations . . . that are primary or fundamental in causal explanation; derivational relations do not have a role to play in explanation that is independent or prior to such dependency relations, but rather matter only insofar as (or to the extent that) they correctly represent such relationships' (Woodward 2003b, p. 211) . In response, it can be argued that the indispensability or otherwise of a theoretical posit is neither here nor there regarding the key issue at stake: in Woodward's account a theory can be truly explanatory even if its 'fundamental ontology' is only playing a thin explanatory role. A right-minded advocate of the account would not infer the reality of gravitational force from its explanatory indispensability, even if Newton's theory had not been supplanted by general relativity, and even if the practising scientists preferred gravitational force explanations over a cumbersome Newton-Cartan formulation. 23 An explanation that captures this 'robustness' or 'generality' of the prime numbered periods with respect to historico-ecological details can be viewed in Woodward's account as maximizing a particular dimension of 'explanatory depth', measured by the number of what-if-things-had-beendifferent questions. (See Hitchcock and Woodward 2003) 24 This theory captures a larger set of explanatory dependencies since it is applicable to a wider range of situations, involving e.g. very large masses and velocities.
What must be admitted, however, is that this instrumentalist aspect of Woodward's account is a double-edged sword for a scientific realist who wishes to link explanatory indispensability to ontological commitment for quarks, electrons, and other non-mathematical theoretical posits: these of course can similarly be construed as playing only a thin explanatory role. Therefore any 'explanationist' argument for realism about quarks, electrons etc. must incorporate more than mere appeal to explanatory indispensability. (I will reflect on this issue further in the concluding section 8.)
Woodward's account of explanation is not the only game in town; there are of course competing theories in the ontic spirit. While not aiming to offer a comprehensive review, I will briefly consider one prominent alternative next: Strevens's (2008) kairetic account.
7 Kairetic account of explanation Strevens's (2008) theory of explanation provides a criterion of explanatory relevance as a matter of difference-making: to explain an explanandum is (roughly speaking) to say what made a difference to it taking place or having the features it has. I am not going to delve deeply into the rich details of Strevens' 'kairetic' account of difference-making. My objective is rather to make the point that also in this ontic account a distinction between thick and thin explanatory roles can be drawn so as to enable us to divorce explanatory indispensability from ontological commitments.
At the heart of Strevens's account is the idea that explanatory difference-makers can be specified by abstraction from the specific details of fundamental causal relations (as well as laws and background conditions). 25 The abstracted difference-making facts are facts about nomological dependence (that Strevens understands as causation); thus, Strevens's is an ontic account. As with Woodward, a DN-type explanatory deduction is only explanatory to the extent it provides information about such worldly dependence relations. (Strevens is metaphysically more committed than Woodward: an explanatory deduction must 'mirror' worldly relations of explanatory relevance grounded in fundamental causal relations.)
Specifying difference-makers through abstraction has some remarkable payoffs. For example, Strevens uses it to give an account of the explanatory role of deliberate falsehoods involved in idealisations (e.g. the ideal gas model explanation of Boyles's law). Of particular interest to us is the way in which abstraction can also naturally lead to mathematical explanations in science, explanations in which mathematics is more than a derivational handmaiden by virtue of conveying 'understanding that turns on the appreciation of a central fact that is a matter of mathematics alone' (Strevens 2008, p. 301) . That is, through abstraction mathematics can acquire a bona fide explanatory role. But at the same time Strevens explicitly states that '[one does not need] metaphysical assumptions to spell out its additional contribution to explanatory goodness' (Strevens 2008, p. 304) . In other words, Strevens denies that mathematics, even when indispensable, gets to play a thick, ontologically committing explanatory role.
According to Strevens mathematics can be indispensably involved in explanation in two ways.
First, the mathematical structure of an explanatory derivation must reflect the corresponding relations of causal production in the world.
regarding the missile's velocity or mass, say, should not be construed as difference-makers in and of themselves, since we could vary any of those precise facts without altering the outcome (as specified by the explanandum). There is an unduly complicated story of fundamental physics about the precise causal mechanism involved. The explanation of breaking does not explicitly involve the details of this story; the difference-maker is rather an abstract amalgamation of the object's hardness, momentum, and manner of impact.
Only by grasping the mathematical structure do you follow the process of production from beginning to end. Second, the mathematics of the derivation tells you implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, what makes a difference to the causal production and what does not, and why it does or does not. (Strevens 2008, p. 329) The first is a matter of mathematics being indispensable to (our best way of) deducing the explanandum from the explanans so as to mirror relations of causal dependence. Here a thick explanatory role is played by facts about causal dependence, and mathematics (quite obviously) only plays a thin role of representing the relevant laws, properties, and causal dependencies. Most explanatory derivations in physics and mathematical sciences are of this sort, and not 'distinctly mathematical' in the sense of Lange 2013.
The second, more interesting way for mathematics to contribute is exemplified by the cicada example. A detailed reconstruction and analysis of the cicada case in the context of Strevens's account is beyond the confines of this paper, but we can capture the gist of the matter by saying that in a Strevensian framework the mathematics functions to show how the explanandum is independent from the lowlevel causal details. 26 Namely, in the stylized cicada explanation (cf. Sect. 3) the derivation of (6) employes number theory so as to allow us to grasp the fact that almost nothing about the causal trajectories of individual cicadas makes a relevant difference to the long-run tendency to evolve a period that is co-prime to every ecologically available alternative.
Altogether, Strevens maintains that only facts about causal dependence play a thick explanatory role, and he is adamant that mathematics, while indispensable in this way, is only playing a thin explanatory role:
No philosophy of mathematics, note, is invoked. I assume only that mathematics is somehow able to serve as a representer of things in the world; this is consistent both with the view that the world is inherently mathematical and with the contrary view. (Strevens 2008, p. 330) 
Broader reflections
The principal aim of my discussion has been to make a simple but crucial methodological point: debates about the 'explanatory role' of mathematics (in the context of the indispensability argument) should be conducted much more closely in relation to specific accounts and conceptions of explanation. There are fruitful, more finegrained discussions to be had about the various interesting cases of explanatory mathematics in the context of the recent ontic accounts of explanation developed by Strevens and Woodward, for example, and in the context of the modal account developed by Lange. In relation to these specific accounts I have argued that the advocates of the enhanced indispensability argument have fallen much short of having shown that mathematics, even when indispensable, plays the kind of thick explanatory role that is ontologically committing. (I believe there are further distinctions between ontologically committing and ontologically peripheral explanatory roles to be drawn in connection with various epistemic and modal accounts of explanation as well, and there is therefore much further work to be done to defend the indispensability argument, whichever account of explanation is preferred.) I would now like to suggest more generally that also in other philosophical contexts arguments from explanatory indispensability would considerably benefit from precisifying the intuitive notion of explanatory indispensability in terms of a philosophical conception of explanation. My argument has taken place purely in the context of the indispensability argument for mathematical realism, but there is an obvious broader context for it. Consider the debate on scientific realism to begin with. The (explanatory) indispensability argument has been designed to mimic similar arguments for scientific realism, and there is indeed a long tradition in philosophy of science, going back to the very architects of the indispensability argument, to argue for scientific realism by attuning to the explanatory role that theoretical posits like quarks and electrons play in science. If an argument for scientific realism about quarks or electrons is nothing but an explanatory indispensability argument applied to these theoretical posits, it should clearly be supplemented with a justification for thinking that the relevant theoretical posits are playing a thick explanatory role. It is an interesting question exactly when this supplement can be provided, and what role (if any) causation should play. 27 Not all realist arguments can be readily assimilated with the explanatory indispensability argument, however, and even in the case of the realist's most famous inference to the best explanation-the no-miracles argument-it has been argued that it can be naturally furnished with fine-structure that critically differentiates it from the abstract explanatory indispensability argument (see e.g. Saatsi 2007 ).
There is also a (related) tradition in the philosophy of science, going back to Sellars 1963 , to accept an 'explanatory criterion of reality':
The only workable criterion of reality is the explanatory criterion: something is real if its positing plays an indispensable role in the explanation of well-founded phenomena. (Psillos 2011, p. 15) Psillos is a scientific realist who takes his cue from Sellars, and in the spirit and letter of the above criterion argues that the scientific realist should be committed not only to the reality quarks, electrons, and such, but also to abstract models, 27 It is not difficult to conceive of potentially relevant differences between mathematical and nonmathematical theoretical posits. There are many thinkable differences in the explanatory roles played by imaginary or prime numbers and quarks, for example, that do not boil down to the noncausal/causal contrast. The simple idea that ordinary observable matter is in some sense composed of quarks, for example, could perhaps serve as a starting point. mathematics, and a host of other abstracta, because they all play an indispensable role in explaining empirical phenomena (Psillos 2010 (Psillos , 2011 . In my view Psillos's brief shares the indispensability argument's shortcoming explored in this paper: the notion that idealized models and various other kinds of abstracta are indispensable to scientific explanations does not suffice to establish a realist commitment to them.
What is needed is an argument that these objects play a thick explanatory role. 28 It is easy to find other explanation-driven arguments in other areas of metaphysics that bear a close resemblance to these examples from philosophy of science.
Some Australasian metaphysicians, like Armstrong and Sankey, are well known to frame their arguments for universals and natural kinds in terms of (something like) explanatory indispensability. As far as I am concerned, such arguments have little probative force without a proper analysis of the sense of explanation in play. Going even further afield, we find instances of (something very much like) the explanatory indispensability argument in areas such as meta-ethics, where we perhaps have even less of an idea what explanation exactly amounts to. 29 There is a general, commonsensical point to be made about all such arguments: ultimately a handle is needed on the concept of explanation involved, for how else can we really assess the epistemic and ontological import of explanatory indispensability, if not by first spelling out what it takes to explain something? 28 For example, Psillos argues that a scientific realist should countenance the reality of (nonmathematical) abstract objects like a system's centre of mass because it can play an indispensable explanatory role (despite being causally inert). Now, if one examines such an explanation in Strevens's account, for instance, the centre of mass naturally comes out as an explanatory difference-maker. But given the details of the account, it does so in a way that need not elicit a realist reification of it over and above of the more fundamental facts by virtue of which it is a difference-maker.
29 See e.g. Sturgeon 2006 and Enoch 2013 for discussions of explanation as a guide to epistemology and metaphysics of moral realism.
